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LEVINAS AND THE IMMEDIACY OF THE FACE
Merold Westphal

Although he is a critical of the philosophical tradition as such French colleagues as Derrida, Foucault, and Lyotard, the work Jewish philosopher
Emmanuel Levinas is as constructive as it is deconstructive, precisely on the
question of ethics, rendered so problematic by the others. His phenomenology
of the ethical significance of the face of the Other not only provides an
approach to the "foundations" of ethics quite different from that of traditional
ethical theory; it also provides a powerful critique of the tendency of religion
to lapse into theories about God at the expense of love for God's children.

'" the view that there is nothing external to experience-no World of
Forms, City of God, independent cog ito, a priori category, transcendental Mind, or far-off divine event to which the whole creation moves, but
only the mundane business of making our way as best we can in a
universe shot through with contingency.
All "homes" are in finite experience; finite experience as such is homeless. Nothing outside the flux secures the issue of it.

Just as much of American culture and society looks like a concerted effort to
refute the claim of Jesus that "one's life does not consist in the abundance of
possessions" (Luke 12: 15), so much of contemporary French philosophy
(often designated by such umbrella names as poststructuralism or postmodernism) looks like a concerted effort to refute the claim that frames the book
of Revelation, "I am the Alpha and the Omega" 0:8, 21:6, and 22:13; cf.
1:17-18).
Through loyalty to (or entrapment in) the metaphysical traditions of which
they are so sharply critical, philosophers like Derrida, Foucault, and Lyotard
prefer Greek to Hebrew. So their assault is on the notions of arelle and telos.
In its search to establish the primacy of unity over plurality, uni vocity over
equivocity, stability over flux, and so forth, Western metaphysics has regularly resorted to the notion of an ultimate origin to be the foundation of
everything or an ultimate goal to be the harmonization of everything, or,
typically, both. But there is no pure origin, divine (creator) or human (eogito);
the only beginnings we can find are relative beginnings, themselves grounded
in that which precedes them. Nor is there any goal by which experience or
reality can be, to use the official term, totalized. All such ends represent the
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wishful thinking of finite parts to be the whole, the effort of centers of force
which can see that they are not the arche to be the telos. The foundationalism
of which Descartes is the paradigm, and the eschatological holism of which
Hegel and Marx are the paradigms are so riddled with paradox and paralogism
that we must eschew the comfort they provide and accept our ultimate homelessness. Neither path leads to Absolute Knowledge, but only to other paths.
The earth stands on the back of an elephant and-here's the kicker-it's
elephants all the way down.
This line of thought, so nicely summarized in the quotations at the beginning of this essay, can be called contemporary French negativism. It is a series
of critiques of pure reason emphasizing the wounded character of reason, its
situatedness and thus its particularity, its fractured character and thus its
plurality. Reason is always indebted, both to the past, by which it has been
constituted, and to the future, which holds all its unfulfilled promissory notes.
A number of observations can be made about this French radicalism, whose
American enthusiastists sometimes bill themselves as intellectual terrorists.
1) Only the details of its critique are distinctive. For example, the two
quotations at the beginning of this essay, which the reader is no doubt quite
prepared to attribute to Derrida, or Foucault, or Lyotard, are not about French
postmodernism at all. The first is Louis Menand's definition of American
pragmatism and the second a quotation from William James in support of it. l
Furthermore, the repudiation of foundationalism is a staple of American philosophy from Peirce to Plantinga, and the repudiation of Hegelian holism is
perhaps the only theme common to all forms of "analytic philosophy" from
Moore and Russell to the present. 2
2) French negativism refuses, persistently and explicitly, to draw the conclusion its opponents would like to foist upon it, a certain kind of nihilistic
relativism. Its exponents are relativists insofar as they make the claim that
we have access to no absolute standpoint. But they refuse to infer that every
point of view or every practice is just as good as any other. They insist on
making distinctions even while admitting that they have no absolute criteria
for doing so. Intellectual life is not exempted from the riskiness of life in
general.
For example, Lyotard argues that moral judgments can never be grounded
or justified. Ought can never be derived from is, that is, prescriptions expressive of justice can never be "derived from other propositions, in which the
latter are metaphysical propositions on being and history, or on the soul, or
on society."3 This repUdiation of justification by derivation can be fruitfully
compared with the critique of evidential ism found in Faith and Rationality,
edited by Plantinga and Wolterstorff. But just as the writers in that volume
do not draw nihilistic conclusions from the failure of a particular, exorbitant
scheme of justification, so Lyotard does not repudiate the responsibility of
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being just and of making moral judgments, but rather asks how to exercise
this responsibility in the absence of the kinds of grounding philosophers have
traditionally sought to provide.
3) The secularism of French negativism rests upon a rather blatant non
sequitur. Its proponents often sound like Nietzsche's Zarathustra, who says,
"if there were gods, how could I endure not to be a god! Hence there are no
gods."4 They often talk as if from their own confessed inability to embody
an absolute standpoint, to see the world sub specie aeternitatis, it follows
that there is no such standpoint. Had they looked back behind Nietzsche to
either Kierkegaard or Kant they would have discovered another possibility,
the more plausible suggestion that from the impossibility of our own finite
temporality's ever seeing the world from the perspective of infinite eternity,
nothing whatever follows about the possibility that God might be able to see
the world from such a divine point of view. Thus Kierkegaard, for whom the
phrase 'humanly speaking' is important rather than redundant, has Johannes
Climacus claim that reality is a system for God even if never for us as existing
individuals, and Kant converts the distinction between the human perspective
we embody and a possible divine perspective we do not into the central
distinction of the critical philosophy, that between appearances and things in
themselves. 5
Against Hegelian monism, French negativism untiringly insists on the irreducible plurality of human meanings, perspectives, criteria, and so forth.
But by never questioning the Hegelian view that the human is the measure
of all things they betray how incomplete is their break with Hegel and how
dogmatic is the atheistic framework in which they set their thought.
There is a double importance in noting the nOll sequitur underlying what I
have been calling French negativism. First, it deprives these traditions of any
pretensions, whether by the main characters or their followers, of having
shown the preferability of atheism to theism. Second, and more important in
my view, it deprives theists of an easy excuse for dismissing their thought.
If there were a substantial link between this radical finitism and atheism, the
plausibility of theism and French negativism would vary more or less inversely. But if there is no such link, the story is quite different. When the
attempt to act as if
A - there is no arche or telos, no pure origin or ultimate end
followed from
B - we do not preside over or have access to any such origin or end
is explicitly repudiated, that is to say, when B no longer has A hanging around
its neck as an albatross, B can be looked at more dispassionately and less
defensively by Christian philosophers. And when that happens, the case for

LEVINAS AND THE IMMEDIACY OF FACE

489

the incorrigible finitude of human knowledge emerges, I believe, with new
power and nuance. Theistic philosophers have every reason to take these
critiques, as expressed in B, with great seriousness. For they clearly have
theological import, and they just might be true.
That deconstructive strategies and insights are not essentially linked to the
secular assumptions that seem to prevail in a French negativism with deep
roots in Nietzsche and Heidegger has been brilliantly argued by Kevin Hart
in The Trespass of the Sign (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989)
and brilliantly demonstrated by Jean-Luc Marion in God Without Being, translated by Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991). In
other words, if the previous observation suggests that French negativism does
not obviously have the nihilistic import often attributed to it by its enemies,
this observation suggests that it does not have the atheistic import often
attributed to it by both its fans and its foes.
4) French negativism can be fruitfully compared with what I shall inevitably have to call German positivism, though it has nothing to do with positivism in the usual sense. Two major moments in contemporary Germany
philosophy, the hermeneutics of Gadamer and the critical theory of Jiirgen
Habermas, share with French negativism a commitment, at once antiCartesian and anti-Hegelian, to the ineluctable finitude of human knowledge.
Both are as allergic to Descartes as any contemporary philosopher, and while
both are deeply indebted to Hegel, they are both closer to Kantian finitism
than to Hegelian absolutism. We might call them Hegelians without the
Absolute.
There is a good deal of bad blood between French negativism and both of
these German traditions. 6 But looked at closely, the ongoing debate seems to
be between two parties who are in essential agreement about how much water
is in the glass, but who insist, on the one hand, that it is half empty, and on
the other hand, that it is half full. While hermeneutics and critical theory
share with French postmodernism a repudiation of both foundationalism and
totalizing holism, their tendency is to emphasize what we can have and not
to linger as long on what we cannot. For both Gadamer and Habermas the
concept of Verstiindigung, of coming to an understanding with others, is
important. Of course, no such understanding is final, beyond challenge and
revision; but then, neither is it nothing. The homes created by tradition,
consensus, and even compromise may be, as James suggests above, themselves homeless; but, insist Gadamer and Habermas, people live in them
nevertheless. 7
What I have called French negativism does not exhaust the scene in contemporary French philosophy. Two major figures, Ricoeur and Levinas, have
much in common with Gadamer and Habermas in the sense that they, too,
can be called the-glass-is-half-full philosophers. Both share the anti-
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Cartesian, anti-Hegelian stance of their French colleagues, but, like their
German colleagues, they also insist that philosophical thought can be constructive as well as deconstructive. Perhaps it is not surprising that these two
philosophize out of a deep sympathy rather than a deep hostility toward
religion. Ricoeur's attempt to develop a philosophical hermeneutics has important links to Gadamer's similar project. Both of these are discussed elsewhere in this issue. The remainder of this essay will be devoted to the
constructive themes of Levinas against the background of French negativism,
with whose basic negations (proposition B above) he agrees.
Emmanuel Levinas is a Lithuanian Jew who, after high school education
in both Hebrew and Russian schools, went to France for his university education and has lived his adult life there. He studied under both Husserl and
Heidegger in Freiburg and was a major figure in introducing their work to
France. For decades he has been an important figure in two rather distinct
groups in Paris, the philosophers, from Sartre and Merleau-Ponty through
structuralism to poststructuralism, and the Jewish intellectuals. Although his
most important work, Totality and Infinity, was translated into English in
1969, it has been primarily during the 80s that he has emerged as a major
figure on the American scene. His impact continues to grow steadily.
The Preface to Totality and Infinity opens with the following sentence:
"Everyone will readily agree that it is of the highest importance to know
whether we are not duped by morality" (TI p. 21).8 In the next paragraph we
find politics presented as "opposed to morality" but tightly wedded both to
war and to reason; and before we get past the first page we read, "The visage
of being that shows itself in war is fixed in the concept of totality, which
dominates Western philosophy."
Since politics is defined as "the art of foreseeing war and of winning it by
every means," it is not surprising that politics is opposed to morality. But the
linkage of politics, so construed, to reason and Western philosophy is, as it
is meant to be, shocking.
The clue to the linkage is the notion of totality. In concert with his French
negativist colleagues and against the background of Nietzsche and Heidegger,
Levinas will develop his own critical narrative of Western philosophy as the
will to power dressed up as the Logos. Its attempts to totalize the world and
our experience of it, to make everything fit within its conceptual schemes,
are seen as a series of attempts to make the world safe for a Self unimpeded
by any Other which is not its own other, that is, the necessary condition for
its own possibility, something to be used, possessed, enjoyed. While metaphysics is the desire "toward somethillg else entirely, toward the absolutely
other" (TI p. 33), Western ontology has systematically reduced the Other to
the Same. 9
Whereas Nietzsche aims his critique of the Western logos at Christianity
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and Platonism, and Heidegger aims his at Nietzsche himself, as the one who
culminates these traditions by simply reversing their valuations, Levinas directs his critique especially at Husserl and Heidegger, the most powerful
recent expressions of the totalizing tendencies of Western ontology.
I shall not give separate attention to Levinas' critique of Western philosophy, which will emerge quite naturally as we focus on his constructive
themes. But it is this critique that is the common ground between Levinas
and the French postmodernists. In the aftermath of their critiques, the increasingly pressing question during the 80s has become, How is ethics possible if
reason is so deeply wounded? It is just this question that is posed by the
opening sentence of Totality and Infinity in 1961, prior to the postmodern
corpus of Derrida, Foucault, and Lyotard. 1o
As his colleagues will do later, Levinas gives a special twist to this question. In the context of the Enlightenment project, the question would be
parsed something like this. For an increasingly secular modernity, God cannot
be the source and guarantor of moral norms, so reason, make that Reason,
will have to take over those responsibilities. But if Reason is deeply wounded,
if it turns out to be merely reason, or worse, your reason, my reason, their
reason, and our reason, each of which is a bundle of unfulfilled promises,
what is to keep the moral life from lapsing into nihilistic cynicism? Or, to
use Levinas' own language, what is to keep ethics from degenerating into
politics?
The question presupposes that Reason is the ally of the Right and the Good.
But, as we have already seen, Levinas challenges that assumption. The ethical
life presupposes the ineliminable otherness of the Other, while the Western
logos, which calls itself Reason, has consistently sought to reduce alterity to
what can be "reabsorbed into my own identity as a thinker or a possessor"
(TI p. 33). Thus the wounding of Reason that I have been referring to as
negativism is for Levinas not merely the humility that acknowledges that
human reason is human, all too human; it is also a necessary moment in
making the modern world safe for the moral life. Only when the totalizing
assault of Reason on the Other has been withstood is the way open for a
genuinely reasonable ethics.
But even if the wounding of reason is seen in a positive rather than a
negative light, 11 the question remains, How, now that the framework within
which Kantians debated utilitarians has collapsed, is ethics possible? In this
context the question is an epistemological question. At issue is how I can
know the Good, not how I can become good by bringing my actions and
feelings into conformity with it.
Levinas' answer, put in a vocabulary not his own, is that our most fundamental moral beliefs are properly basic. He agrees with Lyotard that an
evidentialist justification of them is not possible. Not only can the imperatives
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of the moral life not be derived form theoretical knowledge of any kind, but
the attempt to do so puts us within the very (totalizing) framework that makes
ethical transcendence impossible by reducing the neighbor to a moment in
our conceptual scheme.
But Lyotard's prescriptivism goes farther than this. It claims that "the 'you
must' is an obligation that ultimately is not even directly experienced," that
"the 'you must' is something that exceeds all experience."12
Levinas bases his ethical cognitivism on a diametrically opposite claim.
Not only is obligation directly experienced; it is the only thing that is directly
experienced and, as such, it is (or deserves to be) the most fundamental
element in all our language games and conceptual schemes. (See section 5,
below.)
In spite of his sustained critique of Husserl and Heidegger, Levinas insists,
"I remain to this day a phenomenologist," defining phenomenology as "a way
of becoming aware of where we are in the world" (FFL pp. 14-15). The claim
that we have a direct experience of the "you must" is a phenomenological
claim that has, for purposes of the present analysis, five moments.
1) The first is the claim that "the absolutely other is the Other" (TI p. 39;
cf. p. 71, LR p. 245). By invoking the difference in French between Autre,
the other that may be either a person or a thing, and Aurrui, the other who
may only be another person, Levinas situates his phenomenological claim in
the domain where instead of being a subject representing objects we are a
subject confronted by another subject, one who makes claims on US. 13 Since
a phenomenological claim is always an invitation to look and see for ourselves, this first moment tells us where we should be standing when we do
our own looking.
2) Second, it is the face of the Other that expresses this absolute otherness
of the Other as an infinity that surpasses all attempts to relativize it by
representing it. The face overflows the concept and thereby all my attempts
to possess, to use, or to enjoy the Other. It is face to face with the Other that
I encounter the claim that puts my project of being the center of the world
in question. The immediacy of the ethical relation is not that of intuitionism,
for it is not a proposition to which I have direct access. It is the infinity of
another person incarnate in a face. Thus violence consists in seeing the Other
not as a face but merely as a force (CPP p. 19).14
3) The next moment concerns the content of the claim placed upon me as
I encounter the Other face to face. The "primordial expression" of the face
of the Other, his or her "first word" to me, is "you shall not commit murder"
(TI p. 199; cf. pp. 216, 262, 303). This has the advantage of being very
specific, but it seems a bit limited in scope. Have I really satisfied the claim
of the Other, whose otherness regularly leads Levinas to use the term 'infinite,' so long as I manage not to kill him or her?
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Levinas provides glosses on his basic formula designed to steer us away
from such a reading. It is "the face of the other who asks me not to let him
die alone, as if to do so were to become an accomplice in his death. Thus
[my emphasis] the face says to me: you shall not kill" (FFL p. 24; cf. p. 38).
If indifference to the suffering of the Other compromises my obedience to
the command, You shall not kill, it is clear that there is no short and simple
way to fulfill it. The concept of infinite obligation returns dramatically.
But Levinas pushes further and suggests that morally speaking I find myself
a hostage, "responsible for what [others] do or suffer" (LR p. 101). Being a
hostage is "like kinship, it is a bond prior to every chosen bond ... a responsibility for the other, and hence a responsibility for what I have not committed, for the pain and the fault of others" (CPP p. 123). In making the claim
that I am responsible for the deeds, even the fault of the Other, and not just
the suffering and pain, there is not a hint that any paternalistic privilege
attends this answerability. The point is simply that prior to any free choice
by which I might assume, and perhaps in so doing set limits to my responsibility for the life of the Other, I find myself the bearer of an unlimited
obligation. 15
Perhaps the best clue to the meaning of my responsibility for what the Other
does is found in Levinas' preoccupation with Pascal's notion of "my place in
the sun" and his commentary, which Levinas italicizes, "That is how the
usurpation of the whole world began" (from Pellsees, Sec. 295). He adds (in
the same paragraph which presents the face as "the other who asks me not to
let him die alone"), "In ethics, the other's right to exist has primacy over
my own" (FFL p. 24). But if the Other's right to exist is the right to a place
in the sun, then killing, in the literal sense, is the ultimate but not the only
violent violation.
Levinas makes this clear when he returns to the same theme in another
essay. "My being-in-the-world or my 'place in the sun,' my being at home,
have these not also been the usurpation of spaces belonging to the other man
whom I have already oppressed or starved, or driven out into a third world;
are they not acts of repulsing, excluding, exiling, stripping, killing?" Correspondingly, the ethical relation consists in a very specific fear, "the fear of
occupying someone else's place with the Da of my Dasein" (LR p. 82). There
are many forms of repulsing, many forms of excluding, many forms of stripping, each of which denies to the Other that kind of a place in the sun where
he or she has the human support needed to act well by all but the super heroes
of the human race. I am responsible for what others do as well as for what
they suffer, not because I am their moral guardian and supervisor, but because
I am responsible for their place in the sun, its mere existence, yes, but also
its quality.
4) The fourth dimension of the Other's claim on me is its double asymmetry.
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First of all, the Other is radically above me. The Other's claim comes as a
command from "the Most High" (TI p. 34) whom I encounter as my lord and
master (TI pp. 72, 75,101,213). This is a phenomenological, not a theological
assertion. Levinas is not invoking God as the one who commands us to love
our neighbor. He is claiming that the face of the neighbor confronts us not
as a contractual proposal to be negotiated but as an unconditional obligation.
It is unconditional in that its validity depends in no way either upon our
agreeing to accept it or in the Other's doing something to evoke or merit our
compliance. Levinas' complaint against Buber is that he overlooks this dimension of height in the ethical relation and makes reciprocity primordial
(TI pp. 68-70; LR pp. 70-72; FFL p. 31).
At the same time, the Other is as far below me as above me. Levinas stresses
the nakedness of the face, the helplessness of the one who has nothing but a
face upon which to base such a radical challenge to my own instincts of
self-preservation and self-assertion. The Other has nothing to offer me, "no
beauty, no majesty to catch our eyes, no grace to attract us to him" (Isa. 53:2).
So Levinas insists that the Other is the stranger, the widow, and the orphan
with whom the Bible is so concerned (TI pp. 74-78, 215).
Majesty in destitution. This is the double asymmetry of the ethical relation.
It may seem contradictory to attribute majesty to the face immediately after
having denied it. But the majesty denied is what usually counts as such,
beauty and sex appeal, power and strength, wealth and acclaim, and so forth;
whereas the majesty affirmed is the majesty of the face as such, the naked
face, a majesty possessed by even those faces that lack all those other
"majesties."16
5) Finally, and most importantly, not only do we experience this "you
must," we have direct experience of the face and its claim. "The notion of
the face ... finally makes possible the description of the notion of the immediate ... The immediate is the fact to face" (TI pp. 51-52).
The Hegelian-Heideggerian claim, against Descartes and Husser! respectively, that nothing is immediate and that everything is mediated, was, in
1961, when Levinas wrote this, and has been ever since, the Shibboleth of
continental philosophy from existential phenomenology, hermeneutics, and
critical theory through structuralism to the varieties of poststructuralism.1 7
Especially in France, to be radical has meant to give unquestioning allegiance
to this orthodoxy, which has long since passed from sect to church status.
Levinas' move could hardly be bolder or more dramatic.
"The fact of the Other at each moment destroys and overflows the plastic
image it leaves me .... It does not manifest itself by these qualities, but
1(0.8' o.me>. It expresses itself' (TI pp. 50-51; cf. CPP p. 20). In Plato and
Aristotle 1(0.8' o.me> (per se, through or by means of itself) often designates
the ontological immediacy of forms or substances that are self-sufficient with
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regard to their existence. But it can refer to an epistemic immediacy, as in
Republic 476b. 18 Here knowledge and opinion are being distinguished in
terms of the difference between the philosophic few who can apprehend
Beauty itself, and the lovers of sights and sounds who never get beyond
"beautiful sounds and colors and shapes." The former must be able not only
to apprehend Beauty itself (aUto 'to x:aA.bv), as distinct from beautiful
things; they must also apprehend it directly, though itself (!Cae' aUto) and
not through the mediation of those things.19 It is clearly this epistemic sense
to which Levinas appeals.
In the face, he claims, we have "an essential coinciding of the existent and
the signifier. Signification is not added to the existent," as in language where
the connection between meaning on the one hand and phoneme or grapheme
on the other is arbitrary. Its signification, we might say, is built right into this
sign. But this means that what this sign signifies, is itself. Hence the emphatic
use of the concept of expression above. In this case, "to signify is not equivalent to presenting oneself as a sign, but to expressing oneself, that is, presenting oneself in person" (TI p. 262).
This notion of being present "in person" lies at the heart of Husserl's
phenomenological theory of evidence. For Husserl the "principle of principles" is this: "that every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source
of cognition, that everything originarily (so to speak, in its 'personal' actuality) offered to us in 'intuition' is to be accepted .... " Statements expressing
such evidence provide "an absolute beginning called upon to serve as a
foundation, a prillcipium in the genuine sense of the word."20 For Husserl
perception (ultimately in all its modes) is "the essential possibility of [something] being simply intuited as what it is and, more particularly, of being
perceived as what it is in an adequate perception, one that is presentive of
that existent itself, 'in person,' without any mediation by 'appearances. "'21
There are unmistakably Husserlian overtones to the claim that "knowledge
in the absolute sense of the term, the pure experience of the other being,
would have to maintain the other being !Cae' aVeo" (TI p. 65). And yet the
claim that the face presents itself with this immediacy is presented as a
critique of Husserlian, which is built on immediacy, as well as of Heideggerian phenomenology, which is built on its denial. Levinas treats these two
as an either/or he declines to accept. The one gives a foundationalist, idealist
account of representation, the other an anti-foundationalist, anti-idealist account (which Levinas treats as stand-in for the whole anti-immediacy orthodoxy mentioned above, including French poststructuralism).
But for Levinas the task is to get beyond the structure of representation
that they share. Vis-a-vis the Other, consciousness "does not consist in equaling being with representation, in tending to the full light in which this adequation is to be sought, but rather in overflowing this play of lights-this
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phenomenology" (TI p. 27). This is because the metaphysical/ethical relation
"can not be properly speaking a representation, for the other would therein
dissolve into the same .... To be sure ... usage objects, foods, the very world
we inhabit are other in relation to us. But the alterity of the I and the world
inhabited is only formal; as we have indicated, in a world in which I sojourn
this aIterity falls under my powers" (TI p. 38),22
The expression of the Other !Cae' amo represents, contra Husserl, a "meaning prior to my Sinngebung and thus independent of my initiative and my
power" (TI p. 51; cf. LR pp. 89-90). This notion of meaning that "does not
refer to its constitution" and is "prior to all Sinngebung ... describes the very
structure of a created being." Here "beings have a meaning before I constitute
this rational world along with them. Creation is the fact that intelligibility
precedes me .... This is not a theological thesis; we reach the idea of creation
out of the experience of a face" (CPP p. 22).
This same point can be expressed in other language. Ethics involves true
transcendence "because the essential of ethics is in its transcendent intention,
and because not every transcendent intention has the noesis-noema structure"
(TI p. 29, my emphasis; cf. p. 49 as cited in note 22). Or again, "Here, contrary
to all the conditions for the visibility of objects, a being is not placed in the light
of another but presents itself in the manifestation that should only announce it;
it is present as directing this very manifestation" (TI p. 65; cf. p. 74, where
!Cae' amo is defined as "signifying before we have projected light upon it .... ")
Levinas does not accept the Husserlian notion of a transcendental ego
outside the worlds of both nature and history that can be an absolute origin
of meaning. But in these passages he does not challenge such a notion. He
concedes it for the sake of argument in order to point out that this theory of
meaning is but a variation of reducing the other to the same, or, to be more
specific, of reducing the Other to the meaning I give him or her. Like war,
Husserlian phenomenology defaces the Other.
Levinas associates Platonic and Hegelian idealism with the CartesianHusserlian variety and arraigns them on similar charges. The Platonic doctrine of the kinship of the soul to the forms and the corresponding notion of
knowledge as recollection replace transcendence with immanence. Because
the Other's claim is '''older' than the a priori," a "reality that does not fit
into any a priori idea, which overflows all of them" (LR p. 90, CPP p. 59),
"the conversion of the soul to exteriority, to the absolutely other, to Infinity,
is not deducible from the very identity of the soul, for it is not commensurate
with the soul" (TI p. 61). If the Other is truly incommensurable with my own
self-identity, then to welcome the Other is to learn something I didn't already
know. Hence the sustained polemic against the Socratic reduction of teaching
to maieutics (TI pp. 43, 51,171,180,204). Here too, as in war, the Other is
defaced.
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Unlike the Platonic soul or the Husserlian transcendental ego, Hegelian
spirit is in history, or better, is history. Here idealism is the very opposite of
escapism. But when Levinas looks to see whether there is room in this inn
for the Other, he finds an all encompassing mediation that excludes the
possibility of the face Ka8' aUto. So, against Hegel (and Marx, for that
matter) he writes, "When man truly approaches the Other he is uprooted from
history .... Interiority is the very possibility of a birth and a death that do not
derive their meaning from history" (TI pp. 52, 55). In the Hegelian context,
this is equivalent to claiming that the face of the Other "is by itself and not
by reference to a system" (TI p. 75), that "the interlocutor appears as though
without a history, outside of systems" (CPP p. 43). Or, finally, "The invocation is prior to the community" (CPP p. 4 I ).23 Since Hegel cannot grant the
face this primacy over history, system, and community, Spirit becomes, in
one of philosophy's most tragic ironies, the Other's nemesis. Although it is
only ink and not blood that is spilled, at least in the first instance, once again.
as in war, the Other is defaced.
Heidegger's phenomenological destruction of the history of metaphysics
puts him in direct conflict with the idealisms of Plato, Hegel, and Husser!'
In Levinas' eyes he represents the most powerful alternative account of representation; but at the same time he remains equally deaf to the call of the
Other.
"Since Husserl the whole of phenomenology is the promotion of the idea
of horizon, which for it plays a role equivalent to that of the concept in
classical idealism" (TI pp. 44-45). This is a surprising interpretation, for
post-Husserlian phenomenology (not to mention structuralism and poststructuralism) have waged a sustained assault on idealism's Concept, whether
Plato's £t8o~, Hegel's 8egriff, or Husserl's Wesen under the banner of the
Horizon and its numerous cousins. In fact, it can be said to be Husserl's own
development of this notion that causes his quest for philosophy as rigorous
science to unravel before his very eyes, especially in The Crisis of European
Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy. The theme, developed in endless
variations, is quite simple. Meaning is neither atomistic nor fixed. Therefore
it is never immediate nor complete. This is because every focus of cognitive
attention occurs against a background or in a context to which it is relative
but which can itself never be fully thematized or turned into foreground. To
put the point in terms of physical vision, one can never look at the boundary
of one's visual field. Thus the concept can never have the clarity and distinctness that all forms of idealism require of it, or, to put it in a different idiom,
experience can never be totalized in the concept. Neither as an intuitionistic
foundational ism nor as a dialectical holism can Absolute Knowledge be
achieved.
Since Levinas knows all this, why does he say that since Husserl (meaning
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most especially Heidegger) "the idea of horizon ... plays a role equivalent to
that of the concept in classical idealism" (my emphasis added)? It is because
he asks whether the difference between Husserl and "after Husserl" makes
any difference to the widow, the orphan, and the stranger. The post-Husserlians agree that cognition is always horizontal, incorrigibly contextual. But
this is no help to the Other. The "ontological imperialism" (TI p. 44) of the
horizon consists in the fact that "to recognize truth to be disclosure is to refer
it to the horizon of him who discloses .... The disclosed being is relative to
us and not !Cae' amo." This is because "we disclose only with respect to a
project" and in disclosure we make the Other into a "theme for interpretation," whereas manifestation !Cae' amo "consists in a being telling itself to
us independently of every position we would have taken in its regard, expressing itself' (TI pp. 64-65; cf. LR pp. 89-90). Where disclosure is horizonal, "the possibility of a signification without a context" (TI p. 23; cf. CPP
p. 65) becomes impossible. But this is the most important possibility of all,
for this is precisely what is meant by !Cae' amo. By insisting on its possibility, Levinas renders himself a heretic in the eyes of the post-Husserlian
church.
As the previous paragraph suggests, 'disclosure' (erschliessen, Erschlossenheit) is the key term through which Heidegger expresses his orthodoxy on the question of context. 24 Levinas' sustained polemic against
Heidegger takes the form of contrasting disclosure with the !Cae' amo of the
Other's face, which in this context he regularly names revelation (TI pp.
27-28,61-67,71-78). Because disclosure excludes revelation, it defaces the
Other as much as the idealism it so deeply opposes.
Although he regularly employs the notions of transcendence and revelation,
Levinas remains clear that these are phenomenological and not theological
claims and that they refer to bearers of the human face. What he calls "the
Metaphysical" dimension of life is "an ethical behavior and not theology, not
a thematization, be it a knowledge by analogy, of the attributes of God" (TI
p. 78). What, then, is the religious significance of his thought?
It is in this very context that he makes that clear.
"To posit the transcendent as stranger and poor one is to prohibit the metaphysical relation with God from being accomplished in the ignorance of men
and things. The dimension of the divine opens forth from the human face ....
God rises to his supreme and ultimate presence as correlative to the justice
rendered unto men ... the invisible but personal God is not approached outside
of all human presence .... There can be no 'knowledge' of God separated from
the relationship with men. The Other is the very locus of metaphysical truth,
and is indispensable for my relation with God .... It is our relations with
men ... that give to theological concepts the sole signification they admit of. ...
Without the signification they drew from ethics theological concepts remain
empty and formal frameworks" (TI 78-79).
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In one of his Talmudic commentaries Levinas says that his
"effort always consists in extricating from this theological language meanings
addressing themselves to reason. The rationalism of this method does not,
thank God, lie in replacing God by Supreme Being or Nature or, as some
young men do in Israel, by the Jewish People or the Working Class. It consists
first of all, in a mistrust of everything in the texts studied that could pass for
a piece of information about God's life, for a theosophy; it consists in being
preoccupied, in the face of each of these apparent news items about the
beyond, with what this information can mean in and for man's life."25

In short, Levinas places his philosophy in the prophetic tradition, which
asks of religious beliefs (as well as of religious practices), Are they good for
the widow, the orphan, and the stranger, or do they, like war, deface the Other?
At the heart of his phenomenological ethics is a hermeneutics of suspicion
that knows how easily ontological theory, including the theological mode he
calls "theosophy," can become the ideology of all the modes of violence
against the Other he designates as "war." In the face of the Other, the sheer
face of the helpless Other, he invites us to see the sacrilege of all such
orthodoxies. 26
Fordham University
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502

Faith and Philosophy

"the self-appearance, the self-exhibiting, the self-giving of an affair. .. or other objectivity,
in the final mode: 'itself there,' 'immediately intuited,' / 'given originaliter.'"
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